Wednesday, November 02. 2011
Via The Funambulist
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de Léopold Lambert
Manhattan Archipelago by Leopold Lambert, Oct 2011.
It would have probably not escaped to my regular readers that I am very much interested with the notion of archipelago. After celebrating the philosophy of Edouard Glissant, the poet of the archipelagos, after having created a metaphorical map representing the effective Palestinian territory under occupation as an archipelago, and after having launched a series of events external to the Academia with the same name, I would like to address the spatial implications of Occupy Wall Street via a similar filter.
It is true that this movement has been using the new technological tools of communication in order to spread its existence which was ignored by the Press; however it would be absolutely incorrect to assume that the “occupation” concerned here does not fund its principle on the presence of physical bodies on a given space in order to be effective. The practice of direct democracy exercised on this space registers the latter as a territory within a broader system, an heterotopia as Michel Foucault would describe this type of space, or more simply an island. Occupations started on Liberty Square, then on Washington Square Park, in Harlem, in the Bronx, in Brooklyn but also all over the American territory, thus composing an archipelago of “liberated” islands functioning in a precarious yet effective autonomy. This idea is fundamental in the construction of the movement as it differs from “traditional” revolutions that aim to conquer the centralized power’s territory but rather to propagate by the constitution of those islands that applies a form of society only for the bodies present on their territories. Of course, this territorial mean of acting is more difficult and requires more time than the traditional ones; however this seems to be the way to achieve an aware implication of each person on a given territory.
This model of the archipelago also helps us not to necessarily think in terms of totality but to accept the fragmentation of a territory in smaller ones on which it is easier to approach consensus. The very principle of the archipelago is to construct a collective essence with various individual -for each island- identities. The image of the interstitial water also allow to imagine a fluctuation of each island’s borders that can continuously evolve through time. In a general matter the archipelago spatializes a political system that diverse to be experienced. The Occupy Wall Street movement is a good opportunity to attempt such thing.
Personal comment:
As we are also very intersted into Glissant's work and writings, as well as the applied social experience and contestation in Liberty Square, we take the occasion to republish another post from Léopold Lambert.
Tuesday, October 04. 2011
Via The Funambulist
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In front of the incredible silence of the media about the Occupying Wall Street Movement -the New York Times had a very small article in the NY section about it five days ago bias(ly) entitled “Gunning for Wall Street, With Faulty Aim“- I feel obliged to talk about this extremely interesting micro-society existing right in between Ground Zero and Wall Street in New York. About this very eloquent silence in the press, you might want to read the excellent article by Gaston Gordillo on the never disappointing Critical Legal Thinking. Silence is indeed their best weapon to fight against their fear of this movement increasing.
The Police should know that its brutality is only bringing more reasons to resist the injustice that capitalism develops in its implementation and that now reach summit in the social inequalities. Nevertheless, the movement voluntarily remains absolutely non-violent and leaderless. Organization is the key notion here. A computer lab on site is relaying information directly on the Internet, a kitchen supplies food for the American indignants, and several working group gather everyday to discuss and create how this micro-society could sustain itself in time and implement outreaching actions. At the end of each day, a General Assembly is gathered in which propositions and votes are effectuated in a very communal way characterized by the mean used by the indignants to make themselves heard: one person speaks and the rest who could hear repeat for the crowd further, in a very symbolic union of voices. Here again, the organization is impressive, especially as far as the domain of law is concerned with competent lawyers -some of the National Lawyers Guild- and other Cop-watchers who make sure that nobody is left alone if arrested.
Some people outside of the movement seem to blame the lack of specific demands. I, however, would claim that this group seems to have understood something about revolt: in fact, they create a micro-society, two blocks away from their antagonistic way of life’s embodiment (Wall Street), which implements de facto the democracy and the solidarity they are calling for as a model of society. Just like for the recent Egyptian Revolution, the moment of liberation is not so much the achievement (and therefore the termination) of the resistance movement but rather the process of this movement which forces people involved in it to develop a collective identity.
Here is the minute of the General Assembly I assisted to tonight
Here is a nice short film about and by the indignents
And even more importantly, the legal rights of the protester.
Thursday, June 02. 2011
Via MIT Technology Review
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The Pentagon will treat cyberattacks as acts of war—but how will it identify the enemy?
By David Talbot
The Pentagon will soon release a strategy that formalizes a long-articulated position: the United States reserves the right to launch conventional attacks in response to the cyber kind. But figuring out who is behind such attacks may be difficult, or impossible.
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Cyberwarriors: U.S. sailors man stations at the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command in Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia, where they watch out for attacks on Navy systems and networks.
Credit: US Navy |
"To say that cyberattacks can be acts of war, and that they can be met by kinetic responses, simply confirms a longstanding Department of Defense consensus," says Stewart Baker, a lawyer who was policy chief at the Department of Homeland Security for part of the Bush administration. "Neither of those statements make a strategy, however."
Baker adds that the threat "is much less effective than we'd like, because we largely lack the ability to identify who is attacking us in cyberspace. Until we solve that problem, we might as well claim that we'll respond to cyberattacks by blowing horns until our attackers' fortifications all fall down and their ships all sink."
This problem is illustrated by the famous recent cyberattack involving Stuxnet—a computer worm that damaged Iran's nuclear centrifuges last year.
The Stuxnet worm was a highly sophisticated piece of code that specifically attacked Siemens control systems, causing centrifuges to self-destruct. It leveraged four separate and previously unknown holes in Windows software. And it took care not to damage computers themselves, or other systems.
This technical sophistication, extreme specificity, and lack of other discernible payoff are suggestive of a state-sponsored effort. Many published reports suggest involvement by U.S. and Israeli agents. But as Eric Sterner, a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute, argued last year, a defender could say a competitor to Siemens might have launched the worm, or that intelligence agencies could have let it loose simply to study its propagation.
If something similar were to infect and disable a U.S. nuclear facility or military network, and the United States wanted to strike back, it would be difficult to know whom to strike. However, "we should recognize that perfect attribution is not required," says Charles Barry, a Vietnam-era combat veteran and professor at National Defense University in Washington, D.C. "We didn't check to see that the Japanese fleet was acting on orders from Tokyo before declaring war on Japan in December of 1941."
In addition to the unsolved attribution problem, Barry says that military planners face challenges in determining what sort of cyberattack "constitutes an act of war." The Pentagon's new cyberwar strategy is expected to declare, in part, that computer attacks on military networks, or attacks that pose hazards to civilians, such as damage to air-traffic control systems or power grids, could be treated as akin to conventional aggression.
Some of these issues will be taken up next week, when military planners and others gather for the annual NATO cyberwar conference in Tallinn, Estonia. That nation was itself the victim of a famous cyberattack in 2007 that highlighted some of the new challenges. The attack commenced after the Estonian government, ignoring protests by Russia, moved a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier that had been installed to commemorate World War II dead.
Soon after, attackers based mainly in Russia launched denial-of-service campaigns against government, media, and telecom Web targets in Estonia, paralyzing them for weeks. The Russian government denied orchestrating the event, attributing it to "patriotic hackers."
If such an event happens again, and it results in loss of life or damage to military systems, the victim nation will need to decide whether to believe such national claims of innocence—or, if it doesn't believe those claims, whether to punish a state for the sins of its citizens.
Meanwhile, there is no agreement within or outside of NATO on how a cyberconflict should play out—including to what extent allies should step in. A NATO report chaired by Madeleine Albright last fall noted that large-scale attacks on NATO infrastructure could lead to defensive measures by all members.
The United States created a unified Cyber Command in 2010 to both defend national networks and plan its own cyberattacks if needed. Almost exactly one year ago, General Keith Alexander, who heads the Cyber Command and also directs the National Security Agency, called for global rules of engagement for cyberwar. The forthcoming Pentagon report will be a step toward defining those rules, but it may do little to clarify who's playing the game.
Copyright Technology Review 2011.
Monday, October 04. 2010
We AR in MoMA — YOUR ART in the MoMA: DIY ‘guerilla’ augmented reality art invasion / exhibition @ MoMA :: October 9, 2010; 4:00 pm :: Museum of Modern Art, New York — Floors 1 to 6 + virtual floors 7 & 8 + garden :: Required: iPhone or Android device.
Augmented reality artists worldwide are invited to showcase their work in the exhibition too. Through a submission form on the website, artists can submit their work into the MoMA until three days before the opening.
On October 9, the physical space inside MoMA will host a virtual exhibition, based on Augmented Reality technology. The show will not be visible to regular visitors of the MoMA, but those using an application called the “Layar Augmented Reality browser” on their iPhone or Android smartphones, will see numerous additional works on each of the floors. The experimental exhibition is part of the Conflux Festival, the annual New York festival dedicated to the psychogeography practice.
With this exhibition, the organisers of the event aim to address a contemporary issue, caused by the rapid rise of Augmented Reality usage. What is the impact of AR on our public and private spaces? Is the distinction between the two fading, or are we approaching a situation with an even increasing fragmentation of realities to be perceived individually?
The exhibition is organised by Sander Veenhof, augmented reality experimentalist from the Netherlands, and the New York based new media artist Mark Skwarek. Both artists share a common fascination for hybrid collaborations between virtual and physical entities. By the way, the MoMA is not involved in this yet. But that’s not a requirement anymore anno 2010, being independent and working in augmented reality.
Participating artists include: Craig Freeman, Will Pappenheimer
Personal comment:
The interesting point is that the MOMA is NOT involved but parasitized! I can't see them allow for a "anybody can upload its content". Of course, this sort of mix between digital and physical environments with "fake floors" reminds me of our 2005 project called MIX-m (see link).
Tuesday, September 28. 2010
Via infosecurity
The Stuxnet worm, which has reportedly been successfully targeted at Iranian nuclear plants, is being widely reported as originating from a government agency or well-funded source with political intent. The CEO of Kaspersky Lab, however, says that, whilst there is insufficient evidence to point the finger of blame at anyone yet, the worm represents a new age in cyber warfare.
According to Eugene Kaspersky, the veteran CEO of the Russian-headquartered IT security vendor, Stuxnet is backed by a well-funded, highly skilled attack team with intimate knowledge of SCADA technology.
And, he says, his research team believe this type of attack could only be conducted with nation-state support and backing.
"I think that this is the turning point, this is the time when we got to a really new world, because in the past there were just cybercriminals, now I am afraid it is the time of cyberterrorism, cyberweapons and cyberwars", he said.
Speaking at the Kaspersky security symposium in Munich late last week, the founder of Kaspersky Labs said that Stuxnet represents the opening of a Pandora's Box.
"This malicious program was not designed to steal money, send spam or grab personal data. This piece of malware was designed to sabotage plants, to damage industrial systems", he explained.
"I am afraid this is the beginning of a new world. Twenty years ago we were faced with cybervandals, ten years ago we were faced with cybercriminals, I am afraid now it is a new era of cyberwars and cyberterrorism."
Researchers at Kaspersky Lab say they have independently discovered that the worm exploited four separate zero-day vulnerabilities.
"Our analysts reported three of these new vulnerabilities directly to Microsoft and co-ordinated closely with the vendor during the creation and release of software fixes", the Kaspersky Lab founder told his audience.
In addition to exploiting four zero-day vulnerabilities, Kaspersky claims that Stuxnet also used two valid certificates (from Realtek and JMicron), which has helped to keep the malware under the radar for quite a long period of time.
The worm's ultimate aim, he said, was to access Simatic WinCC SCADA, used as industrial control systems that monitor and control industrial, infrastructure, or facility-based processes.
Eugene Kaspersky's comments were backed up by David Jacoby, his senior security researcher, who told his audience that no operating system is now safe from hackers, even if "some believe certain systems are better equipped to fend off attacks than others".
Reporting on the symposium for ITPro, writer Tom Brewster quoted Jacoby as saying that the reality is that all systems have their flaws which hackers will attempt to exploit and – despite some people's belief Linux and Mac users are safer – all are vulnerable."
"It doesn't really matter what you use", he said, noting that there is no such thing as a secure operating system.
As a result of this, Jacoby argued that firms need to have the total package to protect their systems, from the right technology and anti-virus to local hardening and stronger resource segmentation to prevent spreading infections.
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